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Cedar Chemical Corporation v. United States: The 
EPA's Breach of Contract Under the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 1 
requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to indemnify 
owners of pesticide who have "suffered losses by reason of suspension 
or cancellation" of their pesticide registration. 2 FIFRA is designed to 
remedy the inequities that result when a previously-approved pesticide 
is later suspended or cancelled by the EPA, resulting in losses to own-
ers who relied on initial EPA approval. In Cedar Chemical Corpora-
tion v. United States,3 the EPA cancelled Cedar Chemical Corpora-
tion's pesticide Dinoseb,4 resulting in losses to Cedar of more than $1.5 
million. Although the EPA signed an agreement with Cedar in Decem-
ber of 1987 agreeing to expeditiously process Cedar's indemnification 
claim on its stock of unsold Dinoseb, Cedar has yet to be paid. Based 
upon contract law, legislative intent, and notions of fair play and jus-
tice, this note concludes that the EPA should be held to its contractual 
obligations with Cedar. Cedar's reimbursement should be paid immedi-
ately, regardless of the pendency of another action. 
The significance of this case goes beyond the two parties involved. 
The EPA often suspends and cancels registrations under FIFRA. Simi-
lar issues regarding whether a party is entitled to immediate indemnifi-
cation under FIFRA, despite pendency of a third party challenge to a 
cancellation order, will likely arise in the future. It is essential that 
courts establish definite procedures and standards for indemnification to 
which both parties can be held to avoid the problems of Cedar Chemi-
cal. This standard should (1) altogether preclude the EPA from enter-
ing into settlement agreements like the one entered into with Cedar, or 
(2) allow the EPA to enter into such agreements while requiring that 
they make the language and limits of the agreement absolutely unam-
biguous to the other contracting party. 
1. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982). 
2. /d. at § 136m(a)(3). 
3. 18 CL Ct. 25 (1989). 
4. DinosdJ is a herbicide for control of broadleaf weeds in peanuts and potatoes. /d. at 26 
n.l. 
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II. THE Cedar Chemical CASE 
A. Background 
On December 22, 1987, President Reagan signed into law a bill 
barring the use of appropriated funds for indemnification of persons 
injured under FIFRA.~ Indemnification payments now come from the 
Judgment Fund. 6 Before authorizing payment from the Judgment 
Fund, the Attorney General must certify that "no appeal shall be taken 
from a judgment or that no further review will be sought from a 
decision. . . . " 7 
After the EPA cancelled the registration of the pesticide Dinoseb, 
an association of growers and food processors challenged the cancella-
tion in Northwest Food Processors Association v. Reilly. 6 The United 
States argues that the pendency of Northwest Food Processors pre-
cludes the Attorney General from certifying that no further review will 
be sought from the decision; the case is still pending before the Ninth 
Circuit and could be appealed to the Supreme Court. Therefore, the 
government has refused to pay Cedar any indemnification. 
There is no direct precedent dealing with a situation like the pre-
sent case. However, other cases are similar in many respects. In Leba-
non Chemical Corporation v. United States, 9 the United States Claims 
Court held that the United States was liable for Lebanon's storage costs 
of banned pesticides on the theory of express breach of contract. The 
EPA failed to fulfill its contractual obligation to designate disposal sites 
within a stated period of time after having signed a contract with Leba-
non to do so. Also, in Chevron Chemical Corporation v. United 
States, 10 the claims court held that Chevron, as a manufacturer of a 
pesticide suspended and cancelled by the EPA under FIFRA, was enti-
tled to damages (storage costs) under the Act. The court found that the 
5. "None of the funds in this Act shall be available for any indemnity payment under section 
15 of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act." Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 
1329-199 ( 1987). 
6. The Judgment Fund states: 
(a) Necessary amounts are appropriated to pay final judgments, awards, compro-
mise settlements, and interest and costs specified in the judgments or otherwise author-
ized by law when-
( 1) payment is not otherwise provided for; 
(2) payment is certified by the Comptroller General; and 
(3) the judgment, award, or settlement is payable 
(A) under section 2414 ... of title 28 .... 
31 U.S.C. § 1304 ( 1982). 
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (1982). 
8. 869 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1989). 
9. 6 Cl. Ct. 503 (1984 ). 
10. 5 Cl. Ct. 807 (1984). 
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Government breached an agreement for disposal of the pesticide when 
the EPA failed to designate disposal sites for the pesticide within eight 
months, as required by the agreement. Conversely, in Gro-Green Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. United States, the claims court refused damages for storage 
when the EPA had not entered into a settlement agreement.n 
The issue in this case is whether the EPA is obligated to immedi-
ately perform its side of the agreement with Cedar, or whether it can 
wait until all challenges to its cancellation of Dinoseb are exhausted. 
This issue of finality under FIFRA is one awaiting final resolution. 
B. The Facts of the Case 
FIFRA establishes a framework for the regulation of pesticides 
used within the United States. According to FIFRA, pesticides must be 
registered with the EPA before they can be sold or distributed. 12 The 
EPA may suspend or cancel its registration of any pesticide if such an 
action is required to prevent an imminent hazard. It is illegal to use a 
pesticide that the EPA has cancelled. The EPA is required to make an 
indemnity payment to any person who owned any quantity of the pesti-
cide immediately before the notice of cancellation.13 
On October 7, 1986, the EPA administrator issued an emergency 
order suspending the registration of the pesticide Dinoseb. 14 Cedar and 
the EPA eventually signed a settlement agreement on December 31, 
1987.U1 In this agreement, Cedar promised not to contest the cancella-
tion of its product's registration, and the EPA promised to accept 
Cedar's stock of Dinoseb no later than December 31, 1988. The EPA 
further promised to expedite indemnification to Cedar of its unsold 
stock. 16 The agreement was contingent upon the administrator's final 
cancellation order. 
On June 10, 1988, the EPA administrator issued the final order 
cancelling Dinoseb's registration. However, before indemnification 
11. 3 Cl. Ct. 639 (1983). 
12. 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1982). 
13. /d. at § 136m. 
14. Cancellation Order, United States Environmental Protection Agency. Before the Adminis-
trator, FIFRA Docket No. 590. 
15. Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, Cedar Chern. Corp. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 
25 (1989). 
16. The agreement states that 
[u]pon receipt of an independent audit containing the information required by this par-
agraph, EPA agrees that Cedar will be entitled under FIFRA section 15 to receive an 
indemnification payment in an amount equal to the actual production costs or purchase 
costs determined by the independent audit for the products identified in Attachment D 
or the amount specified in Attachment E, whichever is less. 
/d. at 6. 
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could occur, several groups challenged the legality of the final order 
cancelling Dinoseb's registration. In Northwest Food Processors Associ-
ation v. Reilly, a case seeking revocation of the final cancellation order, 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the administrator's final cancellation or-
derP As stated earlier, Cedar has received no money from the 
government. 
Cedar brought suit seeking damages for breach of the settlement 
agreement. The EPA contends that the administrator's order cancelling 
Dinoseb is not "final" because the order has been appealed and is still 
subject to reversal. Cedar contends that the agreement with the EPA is 
a valid contract and that a third party's legal challenge to the adminis-
trator's order can only affect the cancellation order and not Cedar's 
rights under the agreement. In the instant case, the United States 
Claims Court held for the EPA. 
C. The Court's Analysis 
The court found that the agreement between Cedar and the EPA 
provided for payment by the General Accounting Office (GAO) from 
the Judgment Fund only after two steps had been satisfied: ( 1) the 
EPA's determination of a right to indemnification (final cancellation 
order) 18 and (2) certification of finality from the Attorney General. 19 
The first step was satisfied on June 10, 1988, when the EPA issued the 
final order cancelling the registration of Dinoseb. The second step was 
never satisfied because the Attorney General never certified finality of 
the cancellation order. 20 The court concluded that no payment is due 
Cedar, nor will payment be due, until Northwest Food Processors is 
resolved. 
The court reasoned further that the EPA never promised Cedar 
payment, rather it only promised expedition of its determination that 
Cedar qualifies under FIFRA for indemnification.21 Indeed, the EPA 
does not possess the power alone to effect payment under FIFRA. The 
GAO ultimately pays for indemnification. The EPA can only see that 
the process for payment from the Judgment Fund is immediately set in 
motion. The terms of the agreement account for the kind of delay en-
17. 869 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1989). 
18. Stipulation and Settlement Agreement at 2, Cedar Chern. Corp. v. United States, 18 Cl. 
Ct. 25 (1989). 
19. 7 U.S.C. § 136m (1982). 
20. That is no appeal would be taken from a judgment or no further review will be sought 
from a decision. The pendency of Northwest Food Processors challenging the EPA's final cancel-
lation order of Dinoseb prevented the Attorney General from making such a certification. 
21. CNlar Chnn. Corp., 18 Cl. Ct. at 29 (emphasis added). 
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countered in this case. 22 
Finally, the court maintained that it had no authority to perform a 
function committed by law to the Attorney General. 23 
Ill. ANALYSIS: INDEMNIFICATION UNDER FIFRA 
The court's analysis in Cedar Chemical placed undue emphasis on 
the indemnification procedure, as established under FIFRA and Public 
Law No. 100-202, without placing equal emphasis on the agreement 
between the EPA and Cedar. A binding contract was entered into be-
tween Cedar and the EPA. The court's holding seems to be contrary to 
both the provisions of the contract and the intent of the parties. Fur-
thermore, the court's analysis seems contrary to the intent of Section 15 
of FIFRA. 
A. Contrary to Provisions of the Settlement Agreement 
In Chevron Chemical Corporation v. United States, a case similar 
to Cedar Chemical, the claims court stated that "settlement or compro-
mise agreements are contractual in nature."2• Therefore, the agreement 
entered into between Cedar and the EPA is a binding contract. 
1. Pendency of Northwest Food Processors does not affect Cedar's 
right to indemnification 
Northwest Food Processors Association v. Reilly,25 pending before 
the Ninth Circuit, should only affect the EPA's cancellation order of 
Dinoseb, not Cedar's right to indemnification. The contract with Cedar 
was contingent upon entry of the EPA's final cancellation order. When 
the EPA entered this final cancellation order on June 10, 1988, a bind-
ing contract was formed between Cedar and the EPA. Resolution of the 
current dispute should be subject only to the terms of that agreement. 
There are two distinct claims involved in Cedar Chemical: the first 
between Cedar and the EPA and the second between Northwest Food 
and the EPA. These two claims, though possibly appearing on the sur-
22. The agreement reads, in pertinent part: "EPA makes no representa~ions in this Stipula-
tion and Settlement, either explicit or implicit, concerning the source or timing of any payment of 
such indemnification." Stipulation and Settlement Agreement at 6, Cedar Chern. Corp. v. United 
States, 18 Cl. Ct. 25 (1989). 
23. Cfdar Chnn. Corp., 18 Cl. Ct. at 28. 
24. 5 Cl. Ct. 807, 810 (1984). Chn'ron involved a suit brought by a manufacturer of a 
pesticide which had been suspended and cancelled by the EPA under FIFRA. The manufacturer 
was seeking recovery from the government's breach of a settlement agreement for disposal of the 
pesticide. Sa Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. United States, 671 F.2d 1305, 1309; Blackhawk Heat-
ing & Plumbing Co. v. United States, 622 F.2d 539, 552 (1980). 
25. 869 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1989). 
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face to be connected, in reality have little to do with each other. If the 
EPA's cancellation order were overturned, the finality of Cedar's claim 
against the EPA, based on the contract, would not be affected. Both 
parties would still be bound. 
2. Cedar cannot collect indemnification twice 
Furthermore, the EPA's fear that Cedar could collect twice if its 
Dinoseb cancellation order were overturned is unfounded and should 
play no role in the court's decision. The contract between Cedar and 
the EPA stipulates: 
In the event that such a verification audit determines that the actual 
production costs or purchase costs for the Dinoseb products listed in 
Attachment D were less than the amount determined under para-
graph 15, nothing in this Stipulation or Settlement shall prevent the 
EPA or the United States from commencing action to recover any 
excess amount paid to Cedar. 26 
The contract further states: 
In the event that Cedar exports, or Cedar sells, distributes, or 
reprocesses for a non-pesticidal purpose, any quantity of any Dinoseb 
product identified in Attachment D, the indemnification which would 
otherwise be payable for that quantity of that product shall be re-
duced by the amount of the net proceeds (if any) from such export, 
sale, distribution, or reprocessing. 27 
Not only does the EPA have the above contractual safeguards to protect 
it from double payment, but preparations are currently underway for 
the EPA to accept the pesticide.28 Once the EPA acquires Cedar's in-
ventory, Cedar will obviously have no more pesticide to sell and the 
double payment threat will be gone. 
B. Contrary to Intent of Parties 
When Cedar and the EPA entered into their contract, they did so 
with similar notions of what each was agreeing to do and what each 
would expect in return. Cedar, by signing the contract, agreed that it 
would not seek or otherwise defend continued registration of the pesti-
cide Dinoseb.29 Cedar's only inducements to enter into the contract 
26. Stipulation and Settlement Agreement at 7, Cedar Chern. Corp v. Umted States, 18 Cl. 
Ct. 25 ( 1989). 
27. /d. at 7. 
28. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Requests for Admission No. 9, Cedar Chern. Corp v. 
United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 25 (1989). 
29. Stipulation and Settlement Agreement at 2, Cedar Chern. Corp. v. United States, 18 Cl. 
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were the EPA's specific undertakings in the contract: (1) to provide a 
relatively simplified procedure for determination and payment of 
Cedar's indemnity claim, thus expediting such payment;30 and (2) to 
provide facilities to accept cancelled Dinoseb products owned by Cedar 
and others for storage and ultimate disposal no later than December 
31, 1988.31 The EPA understood that these two grounds were Cedar's 
inducement for entering into the agreement. 
1. The EPA's contractual obligation is unclear 
It is unclear what the EPA is bound to do under the agreement. 
Certain language within the agreement indicates that the EPA has a 
duty to expedite payment to Cedar the indemnification and dispose of 
the pesticide. 32 However, language elsewhere in the agreement denies 
any obligation concerning the timing of the indemnification.33 This lan-
guage appears to be contrary to the earlier language and creates an 
ambiguity. 
2. Established rules of contract interpretation should govern 
A cardinal rule of contract construction law is that the parties' 
own interpretation of the contract controls. 34 The EPA admits that it 
Ct. 25 ( 1989). 
30. !d. at 5-6. 
31. !d. at 8. 
32. The language of the agreement reads as follows: 
Upon receipt of an independent audit containing the information required by this para-
graph, EPA agrees that Cedar will be entitled under FIFRA section 15 to receive an 
indemnification payment in an amount equal to the actual production costs or purchase 
costs determined by the independent audit for the products identified in Attachment D 
or the amount specified in Attachment E, whichever is less. 
!d. at 6. The agreement reads further: 
Based on the above certifications by Cedar, EPA acknowledges that the dinoseb prod-
ucts identified in Attachment D would upon entry of a final cancellation order qualify 
for acceptance under FIFRA section 19(a) .... EPA agrees that it will accept pursu-
ant to FIFRA section 19(a) the dinoseb products ... as soon as practicable . . but 
no later than December 31, 1988. . . In the event that EPA fails to accept the di-
noseb products identified in Attachment D by December 31, 1988, EPA agrees that 
Cedar may initiate an appropriate legal action to enforce this paragraph. 
!d. at 8-9. 
33. Srr supra note 22. 
34. "In the interpretation of contracts whether they be ambiguous in the sense that that term 
is here defined or simply contain language of doubtful meaning, the primary concern of the courts 
is to ascertain and to give effect to the true intention of the parties." 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAw OF CoNTRACTS§ 601, at 310 (3d ed. 1961). Sa also Stevens v. Fanning, 59 Ill. 
App. 2d 285, 207 N.E.2d 136 (1965) ("The fundamental question in determining the meaning of 
a contract is always the intent of the parties, which is to be gathered by giving the contract a fair 
and reasonable interpretation, from the language of the entire contract, considered in light of the 
circumstances under which it was made."); Hart v. Ehlers, 319 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App. 
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entered into a contract on December 31, 1988, to dispose of the Di-
noseb products which are the subject of Cedar's indemnity claim. 311 The 
EPA also admits that its contractor will carry out such disposal as soon 
as possible, regardless of any future developments in the Northwest 
Food suit. 36 Further, on or about March 2, 1989, the EPA's Deputy 
Director notified all known owners or holders of Dinoseb products, in-
cluding Cedar, that they "are now legally eligible for indemnification 
and disposal based on the June 9, 1988, Final Cancellation Order."37 
It was the intention of both parties to the agreement that Cedar 
would not contest the cancellation of Dinoseb and that, in return, the 
EPA would expedite payment of the indemnification and disposal of 
the pesticide. Now, almost two years after the entry of the Final Can-
cellation Order, Cedar is still waiting for its indemnification payment 
and disposal of its Dinoseb stocks. Simply by delaying payment, the 
government has reduced the value of the indemnity claim which Cedar 
bargained for and has forced Cedar to incur legal costs. Cedar has not 
received the benefit of its bargain. 
C. Contrary to Intent of FIFRA Section 15 
1. FIFRA Section 15 is designed to protect Cedar 
FIFRA's indemnification provision is intended to protect private 
parties who have relied on the EPA's registration system. It is designed 
to ensure that such private parties do not end up bearing the cost of the 
government's mistaken registration of a pesticide later cancelled. 38 
Cedar, through the EPA's cancellation order and by contract, has lost 
or will lose its stock of Dinoseb due to the EPA's cancellation of its 
1958); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, ISO Tex. 513, 243 S.W.2d 154 (1951). 
In addition, "[i]t is quite the universal holding that, where the interpretation of a contract is 
fairly debatable, the court will adopt the practical construction which the parties to the contract 
have heretofore adopted, whether by conduct or otherwise." Fort Dodge Co-op. Diary Marketing 
Ass'n v. Ainsworth, 217 Iowa 712, 716, 251 N.W. 85 (1933). 5ff also Hanson v. P.A. Peterson 
Home Ass'n, 35 Ill. App. 2d 134, 182 N.E.2d 237 (1962); Albert v. Ford Motor Co., 112 N.J.L. 
597, 172 A. 379 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 228(4) (1973). 
Finally, the standard of "reasonable expectation" is what should be applied to contract inter-
pretation: "The standard most applicable to a bilateral transaction would seem to be that of rea-
sonable expectation, that is, the sense in which the party using the words should reasonably have 
apprehended that they would be understood by the other party." 4 S. Wu.LISTON, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 603, at 344-45 (3d ed. 1961). 
35. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions No. 1, Cedar Chern. Corp. v. 
United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 25 ( 1989). 
36. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions No. 9, Cedar Chern. Corp. 
v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 25 (1989) (emphasis added). 
37. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Supplemental Request for Admission No. 7, Cedar 
Chern. Corp. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 25 (1989). 
38. 7 U.S.C. § 136m (1982). 
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previous registration of Dinoseb. FIFRA was clearly intended to cover 
Cedar's situation. 
2. A more reasonable interpretation of FIFRA section 15 
Section 15 of FIFRA requires the administrator to make indem-
nity payments to injured persons once the registration has been "can-
celled as a result of a final determination that the use of such pesticide 
will create an imminent hazard."39 It is this provision upon which the 
EPA rests its claim that no payment is due Cedar because a "final 
determination" has yet to be made regarding the cancellation of Di-
noseb. The court cited no authority backing up its interpretation of 
FIFRA when it accepted the EPA's interpretation. There is a more 
reasonable interpretation of FIFRA section 15 than the one adopted by 
the court. 
The EPA concedes that a final determination was made by the 
administrator incident to his cancellation order in the present case. 40 
The court found likewise. 41 The EPA presented no compelling argu-
ment that a pending collateral attack upon such a final determination 
should affect this determination in any way. In fact, when one looks to 
the language of section 15, the clear impression is that such a collateral 
attack should not have the effect which the court has given it. Section 
136d(b) says that in the event a hearing is requested, "a decision per-
taining to registration or classification issued after completion of such 
hearing shall be final." 42 And further, under section 136n(b), any per-
son adversely affected by a final cancellation order can obtain judicial 
review in the United States Court of Appeals, but the commencement 
of such proceedings "shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court 
to the contrary, operate as a stay of an order."43 Thus, the clear intent 
of the Act is that collateral attacks-like the one brought in NorthwPst 
Food-do not affect the finality of an administrative final decision. 
D. The EPA's Lack of Control over Payment Is Easily RPmPdiPd 
The EPA argues that the GAO, not the EPA, has control over the 
Judgment Fund. Therefore, if Cedar were found to be entitled to im-
mediate payment, the EPA could not pay Cedar until the Attorney 
General gave the GAO approval for such payment. This argument 
39. /d. at § 136m(a)(2). 
40. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 4, Cedar Chern. Corp. v. United States, 18 
CL Ct. 25 (1989) 
41. Cedar Chern. Corp., 18 CL Ct. at 28. 
42. 7 U.S.C § 136d(b) (1982) (emphasis added). 
43. !d. at § 136n(b). 
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stumbles under scrutiny. Such administrative approval by the Attorney 
General is not listed as a condition of the contract. Furthermore, al-
though such administrative approval may be required in order to ap-
prove payment of Cedar's indemnity claim from the Judgment Fund 
prior to any judgment, such certification is certainly not required as a 
requisite to entry of a judgment in the same case. If such an Executive 
Branch sign-off were required, the United States Claims Court would 
in effect be powerless to enter judgments in favor of any plaintiff with-
out concurrence by the Executive Branch. This would clearly defeat the 
purpose of the claims court. A holding by the claims court for Cedar 
would mandate payment. 
E. A Proposition 
To avoid further confusion-and thus further litiga-
tion-regarding the cancellation of pesticide registrations and agree-
ments between the EPA and injured parties, one of two possible steps 
could be taken. First, the EPA could simply be forbidden to enter into 
settlement agreements with injured parties. Or preferably, the EPA 
could be permitted to enter into settlement agreements with injured 
parties, but forced to abide by the strict requirements regarding the 
construction and content of those agreements. The language in the 
agreements would have to clearly indicate to the injured party that ulti-
mate payment is subject to the Attorney General's determination that 
no appeal would be taken from the judgment and that no further re-
view would be sought from a decision affirming the same.44 The in-
jured parties should know that such a determination by the Attorney 
General could be impeded by pendency of a third party action con-
testing the cancellation. Finally, the contract should inform the injured 
party that the EPA does not have the authority to make payments 
under FIFRA, nor does it have authority to force someone else to make 
such a payment. Rather, the EPA can only authorize the first step to-
ward payment. 
Permitting the EPA to enter only those settlement agreements con-
taining the above recommendations would be somewhat burdensome 
and inefficient. Nevertheless, the result would be less misunderstand-
ing, less litigation, and more fairness to parties injured under FIFRA. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
When the EPA suspended and cancelled its registration of Di-
noseb, it had a duty under FIFRA to indemnify any person suffering 
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (1982) 
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losses as a result of such suspension or cancellation. When Cedar and 
the EPA entered into the agreement, Cedar gave up its right to chal-
lenge the cancellation order and the EPA promised to expedite payment 
of the indemnification and to take and dispose of Cedar's unsold stock 
of Dinoseb. Now, long after entry of the Final Cancellation Order, the 
government has not indemnified Cedar, nor has it removed Cedar's 
stock of Dinoseb. This is an unjust and unlawful state of affairs. The 
EPA's argument against immediate payment seemingly contradicts the 
language of the settlement agreement, the intent of the parties, and the 
intent of FIFRA. Furthermore, the court's decision simply leads to an 
unfair result. 
The issue raised in the present case is new. The holding of the 
court in this case will set an undesirable precedent. The EPA will un-
doubtedly enter into settlement agreements with other parties who have 
been adversely affected by the EPA's suspension or cancellation under 
FIFRA. The EPA should be required to clearly inform these parties 
that it can only do its part to expedite the process of indemnification 
and that the ability to indemnify injured parties is ultimately in the 
hands of the Attorney General. 
Christian Henrie Jensen 
